Criminalising compliance failure: Will the UK model become the global norm?

Willem Janse van Rensburg

Compliance has just become even more onerous for anyone doing business in and with the UK. Two new failure-to-prevent offences became law on 30 September 2017: the failure to prevent the facilitation of UK tax evasion and the failure to prevent the facilitation of foreign tax evasion.

The Criminal Finances Act, an act with extra-territorial application, has created the UK’s second failure-to-prevent offence (mirroring s7 of the UK Bribery Act), leaving Chief Compliance Officers of all global companies with a new compliance obligation to manage and deal with. The UK has now confirmed its vanguard global role in leading the fight against commercial crime. As stated by the UK Home Office in the press release accompanying publication of the bill, the new offence sends out “a clear message that anyone doing business in and with the UK must have the highest possible compliance standards”.

The observation that corporate compliance, internationally, is at a crossroads is now regarded as an understatement. Compliance professionals are drowning in daily regulatory alerts of which many currently relate to anti-money laundering (AML), anti-bribery and corruption (ABC), terrorist financing (TF) and illicit fund flow (IFF). With these new offences on their compliance radar, it looks as if they will not be coming up for air any time soon. In addition, inter-governmental bodies in the AML/TF and ABC environment such as the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) are also raising the bar and moving from checkbox and rules-based regulatory models to outcome or principle-based approaches, providing for risk management within a Risk Appetite Framework (RAF).

This new offence introduces a further level of compliance and a concomitant risk burden for businesses, and it is predicted to become the “gold standard” for other governments wishing to follow suit. After the Bribery Act and its feared s7 (the failure to prevent bribery), this is yet another development of the criminal law making companies responsible for the criminal acts of their employees and those with whom they do business. The financial services, accounting and legal sectors are likely to be most affected by the new legislation. Action will be required to address risk. A business will have a defence if it can prove that it had reasonable procedures to prevent the facilitation of tax evasion taking place, or that it was not reasonable in the circumstances to expect the same. Failure-to-prevent offences place greater reliance on companies’ compliance programmes as a means of avoiding criminal liability: companies will be criminally liable for acts committed by their employees, agents and contractors unless they have sufficient prevention programs for prevention. The somewhat harsh result: the failure-to-prevent model criminalises companies’ compliance failures.

There are some guiding principles relating to the defence of having reasonable prevention procedures: risk assessment, top level commitment, due diligence, communication and training; and monitoring and review.

The Criminal Finances Act, as part of the legislation addressing AML/TF, ABC and IFF, also creates new “unexplained wealth” orders, which can be used to require those suspected of crime or corruption to explain the source of their wealth; it also enables the seizure and forfeiture of proceeds of crime and it extends disclosure orders to cover money laundering and terrorist financing investigations.

Experts anticipate that this act will help address the global problem regarding IFF. Globally, IFF is estimated at 2% to 5% of global GDP with less than 1% seized by authorities. There is also an extensive and hidden global financial system of offshore financial centres and developed country banks that facilitates IFF and capital flight. It has been estimated that developed country banks, mainly in the US and UK, absorb between 56% and 76% of the illicit funds coming out of developing countries. The Global Financial Integrity Report (April 2017) shows that IFF in and out of the developing world is estimated to be at least 13.8% of total trade (or $2 trillion) in 2014. Countries like the US and UK have been criticised for their double standard approach in dealing with this problem. Speaking in Abuja in June 2017 at the Conference on Promoting International Co-operation in Combating Illicit Financial Flows, Nigeria’s Acting President Yemi Osinbajo observed: “There is no way the transfer of this asset can happen without a handshake between the countries that they are transferred from and the international banking institutions of the countries to which they are transferred.” The High Level Panel on Illicit Financial Flows from Africa, led by Thabo Mbeki, singled out Nigeria as source of most of the illicit fund flow out of Africa. Osinbajo called for criminalising financial institutions.

2017 has seen a number of new developments in AML, TF, IFF and ABC across the globe. Predictably, 2018 will be an important year for compliance as all these new models are implemented and developed to enhance the effectiveness thereof. Usage of data systems and data exchange, interacting with cyber-risk, will elevate the ability to combat crime to new levels by focusing on electronic systems and footprints. Speedy exchange of information, between agencies but also between jurisdictions, will become prevalent and the extent to which some legislative frameworks with extra-territorial application overlap, will reduce the criminals’ freedom of movement substantially. Once algorithmic potential becomes fully utilised, Suspicious Transaction Reports will be processed speedily and probability projections will provide platforms for proactive crime prevention. The development of UBO as an AML tool will provide for very useful transparency. Corrupt regimes will have to be creative in finding new ways to move illicit funds to safe havens. The number of eyes – informed and alert – following every flow of funds from source to destination will increase as companies implement and develop programs to comply with failure-to-prevent legislation. Financial institutions and other regular users of the AML systems need to prepare for coming changes and anticipate the effect of exchange of information between businesses in the regulated sectors.

Compliance as a function of governance and risk is coming into its own. Going forward into the cyber age, AML/TF and ABC will be premised, more and more, on international cooperation; a common approach; free flows of intelligence and information; and the closing of technological gaps which extremists exploit. Delinquent governments might also find that sovereignty is not a complete defence where governments fail to prevent human rights abuses and grand corruption. The AML/TF and ABC legislative frameworks provide very useful legal mechanisms and remedies to combat both.

Anti-money laundering is now focused on effectiveness: Does your system work?

Willem Janse van Rensburg

South Africa’s much-publicised and anxiously-awaited Financial Centre Amendment Act has now become law in order to comply with the global standard set by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF): the inter-governmental body responsible for the global standard in anti-money laundering and combating financing of terrorism (AML/CTF). The bar has been raised substantially. 

This new approach aligns the South African legislative AML framework with the FATF standards and with the expedited roll-out of the 4th AML Directive of the European Parliament, introduced as a result of the terrorist attacks in Europe and the UK and following exposition of the Panama Papers. These new measures aim to enhance the efficiency of the current AML/CFT system and have been introduced to coherently supplement it. Although these measures were largely targeted at terrorist financing, the impact will be felt in all areas of finance, including tax. This comes as a result of substantial advances in communications and technology which make the global interconnected financial system an ideal environment for criminals to move and hide illicit funds, often to evade tax. Tax crimes (both direct and indirect taxes) are globally regarded as predicate offences for money laundering.

This new approach to the combating of money laundering and terrorist financing (AML/CTF) introduces a risk-based approach – as opposed to a rules-based approach – in getting to identify the customer. It also introduces beneficial ownership as a concept. Crime syndicates abuse corporate entities for criminal purposes. Accountable institutions are now required to probe for beneficial ownership to identify the natural person who ultimately owns or controls the legal entity constituting the client. The risk management compliance programme will have to provide for methodology and verification sources in order to address the obligation.

The new regime also affects prominent persons: domestic and foreign. Accountable institutions now have to include the management of business relations with prominent persons in their Risk Management and Compliance Programs (RMCP). Businesses with domestic prominent influential persons are not inherently high risk but the potential of such risks need to be managed. Businesses with foreign prominent public officials on the other hand must always be regarded as high risk. In accordance with a risk management compliance programme an accountable institution will have to obtain senior management approval and establish the source of wealth and source of funds, and monitor the business relationship when dealing with a domestic prominent person posing a high risk or dealing with a foreign prominent foreign official. Accountable institutions are no longer burdened with long control lists and tick boxes for each and every client and can save time and costs through the introduction of a RMCP which entails applying time and resources in areas where it is most needed, that is where the identified risks are high.

There is huge innovation in the risk and compliance space. The potential uncertainties stemming from Brexit and the new US-Trump administration do not appear to have halted the development of initiatives to investigate, expose and punish those involved in business crime.

Across the globe, new legislation has been enacted or proposed which continues to reinforce the anti-corruption agenda. In Australia, the Coalition Government has engaged in a consultation process on proposed legislative reform including the creation of a new corporate offence for failing to prevent foreign bribery, following the UK Bribery Act model. In France, the bodies needed to implement the SAPIN II anti-corruption law are being created and established. The US Department of Justice (DOJ) extended the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act pilot programme intended to encourage corporate self-reporting and it has also sent strong signals that it will continue to take a robust approach to white collar and FCPA enforcement. Acting Assistant Attorney, General Kenneth A. Blanco recently confirmed that the US DOJ “will continue pushing forward hard against corruption, wherever it is”. He also confirmed that the Kleptocracy Asset Recovery Initiative is specifically designed to target and recover the proceeds of foreign official corruption that have been laundered “into or through the US”. He further stressed that in these kleptocracy cases, one of their goals is to return the assets to those harmed by criminal conduct. The Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FINCEN) in the US has also introduced a final rule currently being implemented to be in force by May 2018 which applies to financial institutions who have to align their due diligence programmes with FINCEN’s guidance on core elements of a customer due diligence programme. These four core elements include: customer identification and validation, beneficial ownership identification and verification, understanding the nature and purpose of customer relationships to develop a customer risk profile, ongoing monitoring for reporting suspicious transactions; and on a risk-basis, maintaining and updating customer information.

Going forward, the extent of the workload and responsibilities of every company’s compliance office will increase exponentially as AML/CTF becomes the platform to combat crime effectively. This is the reason it has now become popular to criminalise non-compliance. The effect of non-compliance and subsequent sanctions on a company’s reputation and brand value adds further credence to the prediction above. It has already reached a point where the desire to obtain “credits” from the DOJ in the US is regarded as very similar to proving to the UK’s Serious Fraud Office that there has not been a “failure to prevent”, when it comes to investigations of bribery and corruption.

A chain is only as strong as its weakest link. The success of the global AML/CTF framework depends on the extent to which each country aligns its own national regulatory framework with the global standard. If this is achieved effectively, criminals, tax evaders, kleptocrats and terrorists will find that it has become very difficult to disguise the origin of criminal proceeds or to channel funds for terrorist purposes.

Who can sell financial products in South Africa?

 

   By Megan Hardy

The marketing and sale of financial products in South Africa is subject to regulation under the Financial Advisory and Intermediary Services Act, 2002 (FAIS). FAIS applies to financial service providers (FSPs) wherever they are domiciled. Therefore, FSPs based outside of South Africa are equally bound by the terms of FAIS. This article explains how FAIS works and considers what options are available to FSPs domiciled outside of South Africa for doing business with South African investors.

A “financial product” is defined in section 1 of FAIS and includes securities and foreign currency denominated investment instruments. FAIS requires that persons that provide advice or intermediary services (any act performed by a person on behalf of a client with a view to buying, selling or otherwise dealing in a financial product), with respect to financial products, register as a FSP.

No person may act or offer to act as a FSP within South Africa unless such a person is licensed to do so in accordance with the requirements of section 8 of FAIS. The prohibition on offering financial services in South Africa without the requisite licence expressly applies to FSPs domiciled outside of South Africa. Section 8(1) of FAIS specifically provides that applications by FSPs domiciled outside of South Africa must be submitted to the registrar of FSPs (the Registrar). FAIS has been interpreted to permit South African investors, acting on their own initiative, to invest in foreign financial products. However, the foreign FSP dealing in financial products will still require a FAIS licence, unless all activities in connection with the financial products occur outside of South Africa, and the marketing and sale of interests in the financial products to South African investors is conducted outside of South Africa. Accordingly, it is possible for foreign FSPs to sell financial products to South African investors without a FAIS licence.

It is advisable for any foreign FSP without a FAIS licence, who is approached by a prospective South African client, to document that contact as a “reverse enquiry” from the client. This can offer a degree of regulatory protection to the FSP. It is important to note, however, that a “reverse enquiry,” in and of itself, will not provide any regulatory protection if any marketing is in fact conducted in South Africa. Representatives of FSPs without a FAIS licence should also seek to avoid communicating by phone or email with prospective clients at addresses within South Africa and should generally not attend meetings with clients within South Africa in person. Any funds from South African clients should be received by a foreign FSP without a FAIS licence in an account outside of South Africa.

A FSP domiciled outside of South Africa, who would like to market financial products in South Africa, has two choices. It can obtain a FAIS licence. The process includes submitting an application to the Registrar along with certain information which will satisfy the “fit and proper requirements.” A successful application may be granted with accompanying conditions and restrictions. Registration may, however, be an onerous procedure which could have timing implications.

Alternatively, a foreign FSP could partner with an existing FAIS licence holder in South Africa. This approach could be quicker than applying for a licence. However, this approach is not entirely risk-free.

South Africa adopts International Arbitration Bill: A new dawn for the settlement of international commercial disputes in Africa

Jackwell Feris, Tim Fletcher, Thabile Fuhrmann, Timothy Baker and Jonathan Ripley-Evans

On 24 October 2017, the South African National Assembly passed the International Arbitration Bill (the Bill) incorporating the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration. The Bill must now be approved by the National Council of Provinces after which it will become an Act of Parliament and will be referred to the president for his assent. 

The Bill will align the South African International Arbitration Law with international best practice and should go a long way to establish South Africa as a seat of choice for international commercial arbitrations in Africa. Some of the highlights of the Bill, amongst others, include:

  • the Act will be binding on all public bodies;
  • the UNCITRAL Model Law, as adapted, will have the force of law in South Africa;
  • public bodies, subject to the exclusion of investor-state arbitrations under the Protection of Investment Act, will continue to be able to engage in international commercial arbitrations;
  • immunity will be granted to arbitrators and arbitral institutions acting in good faith;
  • international arbitrations involving any South African public body must be held in public, unless the arbitrator based on compelling reasons directs otherwise;
  • the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards Act will be replaced by chapter 3 of the Bill giving full effect to the New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards;
  • the permission of the Minister of Economic Affairs for the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards in terms of the Protection of Businesses Act relating to business activities in, amongst others, mining, production, importation, exportation, will no longer be required.

This long-awaited development in our law will enable South Africa to promote itself as a seat of choice for the resolution of international and particularly African commercial disputes.

An overview of judicial review in parts of Africa

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By Waseeqah Makadam and SJ Thema

The mechanism of judicial review has become known as somewhat of a champion in our country. In our post-1994 constitutional democracy, the utilisation of judicial review proceedings to challenge administrative conduct (that ordinarily would not be capable of challenge pre-1994) has allowed our prestigious apex court to showcase its revolutionary prowess. However, the use and development of judicial review in other parts of Africa has not been as noticeable.

It would appear that our Constitutional Court (and to a greater extent, our Constitution) has gained tremendous popularity on the continent and in other parts of the world. This may be due to its progressive nature, which stands in stark contrast to the legal regime that existed before the rightful demise of apartheid in 1994, but also because of the robust way in which our Constitutional Court has dealt with certain legal challenges – many of these having been brought before the Constitutional Court by way of judicial review proceedings. In doing so, our Constitutional Court has developed our constitutional and administrative law jurisprudence in an extraordinary way.

Judicial review proceedings

Judicial review is a court process used to enforce the principle of legality under the rule of law (section 1(c) of the Constitution) and the right to just administrative action (section 33 of the Constitution, given effect to by the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act, 2000 (PAJA)). The process has been used many times since the advent of our constitutional dispensation and has been a relatively effective means for holding public bodies accountable. Judicial review is seen as the guardian of the rule of law and it has been regarded by some as the rule of law in motion (Michael Fordham). In 1992, Lord Browne-Wilkinson said that judicial review had become one of the most socially important and legally fertile areas of law. It has become known as a useful and effective instrument in many constitutional democracies.

Judicial review is a very powerful and popular tool in the procurement space for example, where disgruntled unsuccessful tenderers can challenge the awards made by the decision makers (administrative bodies). A challenge of this nature can have a calamitous impact on a particular project or service offering, firstly because the judicial review application is usually accompanied by an interdict of some urgent kind that seeks to prohibit the implementation of the awarded tender pending the outcome of the review. Secondly, in the event that the award of the tender is reviewed and set aside, the implementation of the project may be delayed if the court orders the administrative body to start the tender process de novo.

Judicial review can be used in an array of circumstances, from challenges in relation to small projects administered by local municipalities to massive multi-billion rand contracts awarded by state departments. A memorable example of the latter was when an unsuccessful tenderer challenged the award of the contract that regulated the administration of our country’s entire social assistance scheme in AllPay Consolidated Investment Holdings (Pty) Ltd and others v Chief Executive Officer of the South African Social Security Agency and others (Corruption Watch and another as amici curiae) 2014 (1) BCLR 1 (CC). The consequences that a successful review application of this nature can have on an entire country are remarkable. Allpay highlights the importance of the remedial component of judicial review challenges.

According to a report published by the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance in 2016 entitled, Judicial Review Systems in West Africa, of the constitutions of 194 countries, 80 percent included a formal review mechanism (see page 17). In our view, constitutional recognition of a judicial review mechanism theoretically signals a progressive government, interested in accountability.

The colonial influence on judicial review

Africa is an interesting conglomerate of countries, because for a significant part of its history it has been subjected to the laws of its colonisers and generally adhered to the model of parliamentary sovereignty. However, post-colonial Africa seems to be interested in constitutional democratisation by recognising (in theory, at least) the doctrine of separation of powers, constitutional supremacy and the need for checks and balances. Judicial review can be used to enforce these principles, so with constitutionalism, came the empowerment of our continent’s judiciaries.

While judicial review is not a new concept on the continent, its character, foundation and vigour has transmogrified in certain African countries. Historically, most African countries are associated with either the common law (English influence) or civil law (which includes the French influence) legal regimes. Both systems recognised some form of judicial review, although the French model was considered to be more timid and limited than the common law one.

The so-called common law countries in Africa (including Ghana, Nigeria and Gambia) generally recognise a supreme court model with lifetime tenure for appointed judges. The former French colonies in Africa (including Senegal and Côte d’Ivoire) on the other hand, have constitutional councils that operate outside of the ordinary court hierarchy and judges are appointed for a relatively short period (see: Judicial Review Systems in West Africa at page 23). These two models are fairly different and will somewhat inform the degree of independence that the judiciary enjoys, which in turn impacts on the court’s ability and power to review. Under the French model, the constitutional councils operate in parallel with the ordinary judicial system so issues around jurisdiction, res judicata, access, control and enforcement of orders have been problematic in the past. However, these common law/civil law models were not intended for use in a government that recognises constitutional supremacy.

The constitutional era

The advent of the constitutional era in parts of Africa (including South Africa) has not solved all the legal, political and socio-economic woes in the relevant countries. At best, we can say that it is a work in progress. Some countries, including heads of state and even judges, have revolted against the idea that the executive and legislature do not enjoy absolute power. For example:

  • The Ghanaian courts’ interpretation of its 1960s Constitution left the president and the legislature unrestrained in their exercise of power. A Ghanaian court held that the remedy for an alleged breach of a fundamental right was through the ballot box and not through judicial challenge.
  • In 1966, the Prime Minister of Uganda unilaterally abolished the Constitution applicable at the time and decided to assume total power in honour of national stability. He had engineered a coup d’état against the constitutional order. Even more shocking is the fact that his actions were approved by the High Court in Uganda v Commissioner of Prisons (Ex parte Matovu) [1966] E.A.L.R. 514. 
  • When the President of Zambia intended to turn the country into a one-party state, the Zambian Court of Appeal dismissed the legal challenge that alleged that the President’s plan had threatened certain constitutional guarantees. The court said that, “it is unthinkable to suggest that the government of a country elected to run an ordered society is not permitted to impose whatever constitutional restrictions on individual liberties…” See: Nkumbula v Attorney-General (1972) Z.LR. 204, 215 (Zambia).

(See: Marbury in Africa: Judicial Review and the Challenge of Constitutionalism in Contemporary Africa).

Egypt is another example of a country that went through significant legal changes, including the adoption of a new Constitution in 2014. Egypt’s Constitution acknowledges the judicial oversight of administrative decisions. Theoretically, it is possible to judicially review an administrative decision by petitioning the State Council. This area of law requires quite a bit of development in Egypt and an act giving effect to this right is yet to be promulgated. However, due to the state of emergency, relief via judicial review is limited. One of the biggest hurdles in enforcing the rule of law in Egypt (aside from the political unrest) is the absence of an independent and effective judiciary. In addition, the military’s influence over the government has not been outlawed and an Emergency State Security Court is still in operation and its decisions are final. See: the British Institute of International of Comparative Law Report, dated June 2016, entitled, Protecting Education in the Middle East and North Africa Region.

On a more inspiring note, Kenya’s Constitution was enacted in 2010 and, like South Africa, the government transformed from parliamentary sovereignty to constitutional supremacy. Kenyan judicial review went from being a common law principle to a constitutional one. Like section 33 of our Constitution, Kenya’s Constitution recognises the right to fair administrative action. Article 47 of Kenya’s Constitution states that, “every person has the right to administrative action that is expeditious, efficient, lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair”. Expediency and efficiency are two criteria that do not appear in section 33, so it will be interesting to see how the Kenyan courts apply these requirements in practice. The Fair Administrative Action Act (2015), which gives effect to Article 47, is Kenya’s version of PAJA. Unlike PAJA, the definition of administrative action in the Fair Administrative Action Act is not exhaustive, so there appears to be much room for debate by interested parties who bring judicial review proceedings in respect of purported administrative decisions.

When politics override the law

Challenging parliament’s legislation by way of judicial review on the basis that it does not accord with certain constitutional prescripts has been another point of contention in certain African countries. There are a number of countries in the world where courts are not permitted to strike down laws or declare statutes (or sections thereof) unconstitutional. Switzerland and the Netherlands are two such countries. Until 1991 in Guinea-Bissau, the Constitution entrusted constitutional review to parliament. The Ethiopian Constitution has a similar arrangement in place, where the judiciary is excluded from the constitutional review system and a political body has been entrusted with this duty. See: Judicial Review Systems in West Africa, page 21.

Beyond a traditional constitutional review, where conduct or an Act infringes or threatens a fundamental right in the Constitution, many African countries are yet to develop the law that regulates the challenging of administrative acts on the basis of other grounds of review (for example, that the administrative decision was taken arbitrarily). Currently, in a number of African countries, judicial review is mainly used within the context of political elections. Thus, administrative law (and the judicial review procedure) is still relatively rudimentary in most African countries.

Judicial independence 

Judicial independence is crucial to the existence of the rule of law. A competent and independent judiciary can assist with asserting accountability within government through a party’s use of certain legal processes, including judicial review. However, having access to an effective judicial arena is not the panacea to all qualms that a country may be experiencing. Judicial review is a reactive mechanism that requires interested (usually private) parties to know their rights or have the resources to be advised of their rights and to have the finances and stamina to litigate a judicial review application to finality. These issues are compounded in some African countries where legal literacy levels are relatively low, access to resources is limited and there is a stigma against suing the government.

The result is that judicial review mechanisms are generally under-utilised in Africa and consequently, the law that judicial review proceedings seek to enforce is underdeveloped. In comparison to our sister-countries, South Africa is far more progressive and is leading the way with its arsenal of administrative (and constitutional) law jurisprudence. If the current developments are anything to go by, the jurisprudence will continue to positively develop and at a greater pace, which will strengthen the hand of aggrieved parties to challenge unfair and unfavourable administrative decisions.

 

 

 

First published in Hogan Lovells Construction Newsletter – July 2017

FCA Publishes Notification Guide for Firms Wanting To Rely on MiFID II Ancillary Activity Exemption

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By Carolyn H. Jackson and Neil Robson

On July 19, the UK Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) updated its webpage on the introduction of the commodity derivatives position limits and reporting regime under the revised Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID II).

The FCA explains that, under the MiFID II Directive, firms or individuals who trade in commodity derivatives on a professional basis may, under Article 2(1)(j) of MiFID II, be able to make use of an exemption from authorization (referred to as the “ancillary activity exemption”). This requires an assessment of their trading activities in accordance with the tests set out in the Commission Delegated Regulation, which establishes the regulatory technical standard (RTS) criteria for when an activity is considered to be ancillary to the main business (commonly referred to as “RTS 20”).

Firms or individuals who rely on this exemption are required to notify the FCA annually through the FCA’s online system, Connect. The notification form can be found on the Connect landing page. To help firms and individuals with their notifications, the FCA has published a notification guide on how to complete the exemption notification via Connect.

A notification lasts for 12 months from the date it is first made (or from January 3, 2018 for notifications made before that date). Notifications must be renewed before the end of each 12-month period using Connect.

The webpage is available here.

How to spot PEPs and what to do with them – the FCA’s Finalised Guidance 17/5

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By Daren Allen, Alexandra Doucas and Marija Brackovic

The guidance issued by the FCA in FG 17/5 (the Guidance) is likely to make a significant difference to the way in which firms identify and manage their relationships with politically exposed persons (PEPs). The FCA has used the Guidance in order to illustrate some significant features of new law in this area, much of which is introduced in order to comply with the minimum standards required by the fourth money laundering directive (MLD4).

Relevant new legislation

The Guidance is issued under regulation 48 of the Money Laundering, Terrorist Financing and Transfer of Funds (Information on the Payer) Regulations 20171 (the Regulations), which came into force on 26 June 2017. The Regulations require the FCA to issue guidance in relation to the enhanced due diligence (EDD) to be carried out in respect of PEPs, their family members and known close associates, and list specific matters that such guidance must cover.

The FCA has also used the Guidance as a means of fulfilling a requirement under section 333U of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, which is not yet in force2. Section 333U will also require the FCA to issue guidance in relation to PEPs, which must again cover specific (but slightly different) points.

Structure of due diligence requirements in the Regulations in relation to PEPs

There are a number of requirements in the Regulations that are relevant to firms’ treatment of PEPs. These include:

  • regulation 33, which provides that a relevant person must apply EDD and enhanced ongoing monitoring to manage and mitigate risks arising in particular scenarios, including: where the risk assessment performed by the firm under regulation 18 identifies a case as involving a high risk of money laundering; in a business relationship with a person established in a “high-risk third country”; and if a customer or potential customer is determined to be a PEP (or family member or known close associate of a PEP); and
  • regulation 35, which contains the principal requirement that a relevant person “must have in place appropriate risk-management systems and procedures to determine whether a customer or the beneficial owner of a customer” is a PEP (or a family member or known close associate of a PEP), and “to manage the enhanced risks arising from the relevant person’s business relationship or transactions with such a customer”. Regulation 35 also includes the following:
    • factors to take into account in determining what risk management systems and procedures are appropriate;
    • a requirement to assess the level of risk associated with each such customer, and the extent of EDD measures to be applied (which may differ from case to case);
    • requirements to: (a) obtain approval from senior management for the business relationship; (b) take adequate measures to establish the source of wealth and source of funds involved in the proposed relationship or transaction; and (c) conduct enhanced ongoing monitoring;
    • specific provisions in relation to insurers;
    • specific provisions in relation to those who were PEPs but have retired from the relevant public function that made them so; and
    • provisions (which we discuss below) defining what a PEP actually is.

How important is the Guidance (section 333U(3))?

The Guidance issued by the FCA may be more important even than it first appears. Section 333U(3) states that the Secretary of State may, by regulations, provide for arrangements for complaints about the treatment of individuals to be adjudicated by the FCA, including where such individual was refused a business relationship solely because he or she was a PEP. Relevant complaints for these purposes would also include cases where an individual was wrongly classified as a PEP, and cases where a PEP was treated “unreasonably in disregard of [the Guidance]”, particularly in relation to the “requirement to take a proportional, risk-based and differentiated approach” to dealing with PEPs.

Should that happen, it would effectively mean that the FCA is (in respect of the contents of the Guidance) both rule-maker and arbiter in respect of the treatment of PEPs. This may be significant in the context of de-risking in particular (as to which see below).

Who is a PEP?

Both the Regulations and section 333U effectively require the FCA to issue guidance on the identification of PEPs. Regulation 35(12) says that a PEP is “an individual who is entrusted with prominent public functions, other than as a middle-ranking or more junior official”. Regulation 35(14) sets out a non-exhaustive list of individuals entrusted with prominent public functions, e.g. heads of state, members of parliaments, members of the governing bodies of political parties, members of supreme courts, ambassadors, high-ranking military officers etc.

The Guidance is quite detailed in places, in terms of how to interpret these categories and the phrase “prominent public function”. There are some notable exclusions, such as local government officials in the UK (although not necessarily in other countries).

Firms are required to consider whether the nature of the position held gives rise to the risk of large-scale abuse of position. The Guidance specifically says that the firm’s view should be coloured by the jurisdiction involved – if it is one assessed as being at a lower risk of large-scale corruption, then firms should only treat those with “true executive power” as holding prominent public functions.

The Guidance states that firms are expected to make use of “information that is reasonably available to them”, including public domain information such as websites of parliaments and reliable public registers. Interestingly, the FCA also refers to material published by “reputable pressure groups”. In any event, the firm must make a judgement as to the reliability of the information source used.

There is also guidance to the effect that firms can use commercial databases that list PEPs, but the firm retains responsibility for satisfying itself that such databases are populated in an appropriate way. They also retain responsibility for ensuring that those flagged by such databases as PEPs actually are.

It appears from the Guidance that the type of information a firm is expected to use in order to conduct its EDD (presumably as distinct from identifying a PEP in the first place) will vary according to the risk posed by the individual PEP – in low-risk cases, for example, the firm may use only information already available to it.

Differential levels of EDD

Regulation 35(4) contemplates that the scope of EDD required may differ from case to case, although firms are required to take certain matters into account. Section 333U(2) will positively require “a proportional, risk-based and differentiated approach”, and it appears from section 333U(3) (referred to above) that PEPs may be able to complain to the FCA if firms do not do this in accordance with the Guidance.

The Guidance requires firms to take into account a number of risk factors and form a “holistic” view. Such risk factors include the product involved in the transaction, and matters specific to the PEP concerned. For example, the existence of transparency requirements such as registers of interests, would be suggestive of low risk, whereas an extravagant lifestyle or responsibility for public procurement exercises would be suggestive of higher risk.

Much of the relevant Guidance, however, relates to geographical issues, and the identification of higher and lower risk countries. By way of example, “a PEP who is entrusted with a prominent public function in the UK should be treated as low risk, unless the firm has assessed that other risk factors not linked to their position as a PEP mean they pose a higher risk”.

Opposition MPs present an interesting example in this context. The Guidance says that in a low-risk jurisdiction like the UK, only those with true executive power should be considered to hold a prominent public function. It also describes opposition MPs as having a lack of executive decision-making responsibilities. That would suggest that (applying the Guidance) UK opposition MPs might not be properly defined as PEPs at all, but the Guidance appears to contemplate that they will be PEPs (and thus subject to EDD), albeit low-risk ones. The answer to this may well be that the Regulation arguably prescribes that all members of parliaments are PEPs, but the ambiguity in this case illustrates some of the difficulty with the differentiated approach.

The Guidance provides practical advice in terms of the EDD required in lower-risk cases. This includes less frequent formal review, and less intrusive efforts to identify the source of wealth and funds in relation to transactions.

In any event, the Guidance is clear that firms’ risk assessments must be clearly documented, and this would appear to be common sense in any event.

De-risking (the practice of firms ending relationships with higher-risk clients like PEPs) has been a discussion point for some time, and it is fair to say that attitudes to it have shifted. In its final notice to Guaranty Trust Bank (UK) Ltd, the FCA took account (in a positive way) of the firm’s “strategic decision to move away from establishing relationships with PEPs, including exiting current relationships, wherever possible”3. The tide has now turned for PEPs, following the content of MLD4. The Guidance states that the FCA does not expect firms to reject a customer (or potential customer) “merely because that person meets the definition of a PEP”. Interestingly, the FCA appears to characterise this expectation as an interpretation, rather than a restatement, of legal obligations. For the reasons set out above, however, the effect of section 333U(3) may effectively be to make the Guidance akin to an enforceable rule.

It is questionable, however, how useful it will really be. As a matter of principle, the question of who it wishes to deal with is a commercial decision for a firm. There are cases where commercial freedom of choice is eroded (e.g. in relation to the cab-rank principle applicable to barristers, or the restrictions on businesses refusing to deal with individuals for discriminatory reasons). Cynics might suspect, however, that in all such cases, businesses often manage to avoid taking on work they do not want. It may be that the Guidance will discourage generalised de-risking, but it is also likely that some firms will simply be careful to ensure that they document carefully alternative reasons for declining business with PEPs.

The Guidance goes on to provide that, where firms are unable to apply the EDD measures that they consider to be appropriate, they must decline the business relationship. This raises the obvious possibility of firms deciding on very onerous EDD measures as a means of avoiding taking on PEPs. It would appear from the wording of section 333U(3), however, that the FCA may in future be able to adjudicate on firms’ decisions as to what an appropriate level of EDD is, a point to which we return in the conclusions section below.

Family and known close associates

Regulation 35(12) contains non-exhaustive lists of those who will be deemed the family and known close associates of a PEP. As regards family, the Regulation lists spouses/civil partners, children (and their spouses or civil partners), and parents, but the Guidance also makes it clear that the FCA will view siblings, and in some cases others, as family members for this purpose. The breadth of the interpretation of “family” will (in the FCA’s view) depend on the risk assessment in relation to the PEP – where the PEP is deemed to pose a low risk, then the FCA says that family members other than those expressly listed by the Regulation should not be subject to EDD.

The FCA is also clear that such people are not themselves to be treated as PEPs, and notes the requirement in regulation 35(11), that once a PEP “retires”, the regulatory requirements applicable to family and known close associates cease to apply at once (as opposed to the 12-month “run-off” period for PEPs themselves). It is worth noting, however, that this provision is independent of other requirements in the Regulations to conduct EDD. On that basis, where a spouse of a former PEP is based in a high-risk third country, for example, the requirement to conduct EDD will continue to apply.

Senior management sign-off

The Guidance sets out the FCA’s interpretation of the requirement for the approval of senior management for the establishment or continuation of a relationship with a PEP. It states that at minimum, the Money Laundering Reporting Officer (MLRO) must sign off, and in higher risk cases, the person with (for banks) the prescribed responsibility of overall responsibility for the firm’s policies and procedures for countering the risk that the firm might be used to further financial crime. As both individuals within a bank would be authorised by the FCA as senior managers, it is not immediately obvious why the MLRO is seen by the FCA as more “junior” in this context in terms of regulatory responsibility.

Ongoing monitoring

The Regulations require enhanced ongoing monitoring of PEPs. The Guidance states that the nature and extent of such monitoring will depend on the firm’s risk assessment. Interestingly, the Regulations do not expressly provide for differentiated ongoing monitoring, as distinct from EDD, but that may be a reasonable inference to draw from the wording of regulation 35, and certainly seems to be the FCA’s current approach.

Conclusions

The Guidance provides a significant amount of detail which will be helpful to firms, but there are potential difficulties in its application. It is clear, however, that firms will need to consider each case on its merits, and document that they have done so. The possibility of the FCA acquiring the power to adjudicate on complaints in relation to these matters raises an interesting question as to the scope of firms’ freedom of decision-making, and the standard that will be applied by the FCA in considering complaints. Will firms be required to adopt what is objectively the most reasonable approach in relation to the EDD required for each PEP, or will it be enough for firms to adopt a rational approach? These matters will need significant further thought, should the powers under section 333U(3) be exercised.

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London Interbank Offered Rate to Be Replaced By End of 2021

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By Jennifer Hancock and Simon Finch

 

The U.K.’s Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) recently announced that the London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) is to be phased out by the end of 2021 and replaced with a more reliable alternative.

LIBOR is a daily benchmark interest rate set at approximately 11:45 a.m. (London time) every morning by a panel of leading banks in the U.K. It is the average rate the banks estimate they’d be able to borrow money from each other in different currencies and over different time periods. In other words, it is the applicable rate for unsecured bank-to-bank borrowing. LIBOR is currently used as a reference to price trillions of dollars of financial contracts around the world, including mortgages, loans, credit cards and complex derivatives contracts.

The intention to replace LIBOR has been applauded by many, including regulators, following an investigation in 2012, which revealed that certain banks in the U.K. were fixing the rate, resulting in billions of dollars in fines to such banks and the conviction of several bankers. Following this industry-wide scandal, the FCA took on interim oversight of LIBOR in 2013 and put Intercontinental Exchange Benchmark Administration (IBA) in charge of administering the rate in 2014. IBA is a U.K. company based in London that is authorized to administer benchmarks and regulated by the FCA.

Aside from LIBOR’s susceptibility to manipulation, the FCA has argued that LIBOR is a problematic benchmark rate because the market supporting LIBOR — that is, the market for unsecured wholesale term lending to banks — is no longer “sufficiently active”. For one currency and lending period in 2016, for example, there were only 15 transactions executed between the panel banks. Accordingly, banks are uncomfortable submitting daily rates based on minimal borrowing activity. If an active market does not exist, then even the best administered benchmark cannot measure it properly. The FCA plans to replace LIBOR by the end of 2021 with a substitute rate that is based firmly on market transactions. In the meantime, while panel banks are being asked to continue to voluntarily set LIBOR daily, they will no longer be compelled to do so by the FCA.

At this time, it is unclear what exactly will replace LIBOR, although a number of groups have been considering alternatives that are significantly tied to active markets and based on actual market transactions. For example, the Bank of England is currently looking into replacing LIBOR in contracts with the Sterling Overnight Index Average (or SONIA), an overnight funding rate in the sterling unsecured market. Switzerland has plans to replace its own key swaps rate, TOIS, with a new benchmark rate by the end of this year. In addition, concerns have been growing in Europe over the Euro Interbank Offered Rate (or Euribor), a Euro-dominated version of LIBOR, as Eurozone banks are pulling out of the relevant rate-setting panels.

Similarly, the U.S. Federal Reserve is in the process of developing a substitute for U.S. dollar LIBOR. This past June, the Alternative Reference Rates Committee, an industry body set up by the U.S. government, recommended that banks start using a new broad Treasuries repurchase (repo) rate linked to the cost of borrowing cash secured against U.S. governmental debt (also known as Treasuries), as a replacement for U.S. dollar LIBOR.

According to the FCA, the benefit of the foregoing alternative benchmarks in comparison to LIBOR is that they are based on actual transaction data from relevant market participants. This, it is argued, will help to alleviate fairness concerns rooted in the fact that daily LIBOR is currently determined by the “expert judgment” of certain banks that sit on the rate-setting panels.

So how will the scheduled demise of LIBOR impact syndicated loan agreements? Certainly there is no easy fix before the market lands on an alternative rate. While the Loan Syndications and Trading Association did meet on July 20, 2017 to discuss the matter, it will likely be some time before there is consensus on the new pricing mechanic and how it should be papered. In the meantime, parties will have to rely upon the fallback definition of LIBOR (assuming that it doesn’t also refer to an underlying benchmark) or the alternate rate provision (which defaults to a floating rate). While these options were always designed as short-term solutions on a narrow scale, they may ultimately be broadly relied on for longer periods of time while the market sorts itself out. Also, we expect that borrowers may ask that any change to a benchmark rate be subject to majority (rather than unanimous) lender approval, such that — if and when the market lands on a solution — amendments can be more readily made.

 

Blakes periodically provides materials on our services and developments in the law to interested persons.This article is for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice or an opinion on any issue. Blakes would be pleased to provide additional details or advice about specific situations if desired. For permission to reprint articles, please contact the Blakes Marketing Department at 416-863-4345 and teona.baetu@blakes.com © 2017 Blake, Cassels & Graydon LLP.

Blakes offrepériodiquement des documents sur les tendances et les faits nouveaux en matièrejuridique aux personnes qui le désirent. Cet article est publié à titreinformatif uniquement et ne constitue pas un avis juridique ni une opinion sur un quelconque sujet. Nousserons heureux de vous fournir des détails supplémentaires ou des conseils surdes situations particulières si vous le souhaitez. Pour obtenir l’autorisationde reproduire les articles, veuillez communiquer avec le service Marketing etcommunications de Blakes au 514-982-4026 ou par courriel à l’adresse charles.sieuw@blakes.com. © 2017 Blake, Cassels & Graydon S.E.N.C.R.L./s.r.l.

ISDA Master Agreement – Court of Appeal favours chosen law over local “mandatory laws”

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By Alexander Hewitt

 

When commercial parties choose English law to govern their hedging or financing contracts, the English courts will usually apply that choice with very few exceptions. A recent Court of Appeal case further narrows one such exception (the Article 3(3) Exception): Dexia Crediop SpA v. Comune di Prato [2017] EWCA Civ 428.

In narrowing the Article 3(3) Exception, the court in Dexia applied another recent Court of Appeal ruling: Banco Santander Totta v. Companhia Carris De Ferro De Lisboa [2016] EWCA Civ 1267. This:

  • makes Dexia a particularly strong precedent; and
  • shows a strong trend in the case law towards giving participants in the swaps market who use the ISDA Master Agreement a high degree of certainty that the English courts will apply their chosen governing law.

The dispute

An Italian local authority (Prato) defaulted under a swap concluded with Dexia under the ISDA Master Agreement Multi-Currency – Cross-Border form (the Swap). The Swap contained an express choice of English governing law and jurisdiction. Among other arguments against making payment, Prato invoked the Article 3(3) Exception. They pointed to the fact that both parties were Italian and the Swap provided for payment in Italy. This, argued Prato, meant the Swap did not bind them, because it did not comply with certain “mandatory rules” of Italian law which, they argued, overrode the chosen English law.

The Article 3(3) Exception to the chosen law

For contracts concluded from 17 December 2009, this exception arises under article 3(3) of the Rome I Regulation (593/2008) (Rome I). For contracts made between 1 April 1991 and Rome I coming into force, the Article 3(3) Exception arises under the (similarly drafted) article 3(3) of the Rome Convention.

The Swap was entered into when the Rome Convention applied. The Rome Convention version of article 3(3) reads:

“The fact that the parties have chosen a foreign law … shall not, where all the other elements relevant to the situation at the time of the choice are connected with one country only, prejudice the application of rules of the law of that country which cannot be derogated from the contract, hereinafter called “mandatory rules”.

So, under article 3(3):

  • parties may have chosen one state’s laws as their governing law; but
  • if all elements (apart from that above choice) “relevant to the situation at the time of the choice are connected with one” other “country only”:
  1. the Article 3(3) Exception applies; and
  2. consequently, mandatory rules of that one other country may override the chosen law.

Relevant international element precludes all relevant “elements” being connected with one country only

Following the Banco Santander Totta ruling, the Court of Appeal in the Dexia case held that, as the Swap had an “international element”, that meant:

  • the Swap could not be exclusively connected with a single country (Italy) other than the country of the chosen law; and
  • the chosen law applied, and not mandatory rules of Italian law under the Article 3(3) Exception.

Use of ISDA documents as international elements

The court found these features of the Swap gave it an international character:

  • use of the ISDA Master Agreement, which is inherently an international standard form rather than a contract connected with any one country;
  • in particular, use of the Multi-Currency – Cross-Border version of the ISDA Master Agreement, which, the court noted, envisaged more than one currency and country, and was in the English language, which was not the first language of either party to the Swap; and
  • the “highly significant” fact that Dexia had (as, the court recognised, was routine in this market) hedged its position under the Swap with back-to-back swaps with non-Italian banks. This showed “just how international the swaps market actually is”, said the court.

Rome I

As noted above, the drafting of article 3(3) Rome I and article 3(3) of the Rome Convention is similar, if not identical. This makes the Dexia case highly relevant to the application of article 3(3) Rome I to contracts made on or after 17 December 2009.

Recent Changes to the Beneficial Ownership Register Regime in the UK

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Graeme Sloan, Vladimir Maly, Gary Brown and Andrew Boyd

Important reforms designed to increase the transparency of the ownership and control of UK companies and English law LLPs were introduced in the UK on 6 April 2016. Among the most significant of these was a requirement for UK companies and English law limited liability partnerships (LLPs) to maintain a compulsory statutory register (the “PSC register”) of certain persons with significant control (PSCs), who are usually individuals, and registrable relevant legal entities (RLEs). This is referred to as the PSC Regime.

When the PSC Regime was introduced, the requirement to maintain a PSC register applied to English law LLPs and most UK incorporated companies. However, certain UK incorporated companies fell outside the PSC Regime and did not need to maintain a PSC register, these were:

  • companies already subject to the disclosure requirements of chapter 5 of the Disclosure Guidance and Transparency Rules (DTRs) as set out in the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) Handbook (broadly including companies listed on an EEA-regulated market such as the London Stock Exchange’s main market for which the UKis their home state or UK public companies with shares admitted to trading on prescribed markets including AIM and the NEX Exchange Growth Market);
  • companies with voting shares admitted to trading on a regulated market in an EEA state other than the UK; and
  • companies with voting shares admitted to certain other specified markets in the United States, Japan, Israel and Switzerland.

Key changes

The Information about People with Significant Control (Amendment) Regulations 2017 (the “PSC Amendment Regulations”) came into force on 26 June 2017 and form part of the UK’s implementation of Directive 2015/849/EU (the “Fourth Money Laundering Directive”) which EU member states were required to implement on that date.

The main changes introduced by the PSC Amendment Regulations are to:

  • bring additional companies within the ambit of the PSC Regime;
  • introduce new deadlines for filing relevant information with Companies House; and
  • alter the manner in which information is notified to Companies House.

Additional entities fall within the PSC Regime

As a result of the PSC Amendment Regulations entering into force, additional entities now fall within the PSC Regime which has been extended to include:

  • UK-incorporated companies trading on AIM (and other companies with shares that are admitted to trading on a “prescribed market” such as the NEX Exchange Growth Market) because the statutory definition of companies that are exempt from the PSC Regime has been narrowed;
  • certain types of Scottish limited partnerships and certain other Scottish partnerships. Scottish partnerships that are affected do not have to maintain their own separate PSC register, but must obtain and submit their relevant PSC information to Companies House and are subject to a requirement to update any changes; and
  • some unregistered companies.

These changes mean that the only UK-incorporated companies that are exempt from the PSC Regime are:

  • those with voting shares admitted to trading on a regulated market situated in an EEA state such as the London Stock Exchange’s Main Market; and
  • companies with voting shares admitted to trading on certain specified markets in the United States, Japan, Israel and Switzerland.

Actions to be taken by UK-incorporated AIM-listed companies

Unless a UK-incorporated AIM-listed company falls within one of the exemptions listed above, it is now subject to the PSC Regime and must:

  • from 26 June 2017 investigate its ownership and control;
  • from 24 July 2017 maintain a PSC register; and
  • on an ongoing basis, monitor its PSC and RLE details, update its PSC register and comply with its filing obligations at Companies House.

Failure to comply with the PSC Regime is a criminal offence and the company and its directors and officers may be subject to an unlimited fine or imprisonment for up to two years or both.

Therefore UK-incorporated AIM companies should investigate and collect information on their PSCs and RLEs. Where appropriate, they should issue notices to any registrable PSCs (or persons whom they have reasonable cause to believe may be registrable) to help identify them correctly and to obtain the information necessary to complete the PSC register. Notices should also be issued to obtain the prescribed information required in respect of any registrable RLEs to enable the AIM company to complete its PSC register. The PSC register should also be drawn up, and companies should ensure that it is ready by 24 July 2017 and any other filings required by Companies House should also be prepared.

New filing requirements

Subject to a short transitional period for UK-incorporated AIM-listed companies, from 26 June 2017 all companies subject to the PSC Regime must:

  • update their PSC register within 14 days from when the company became aware of a change to their PSC or RLE details (which particulars need to be sought and, where relevant, confirmed promptly); and
  • file the updated information with Companies House using the appropriate form within the subsequent 14 days.

Manner in which information is notified and other changes

  • PSC register information no longer needs to be delivered to Companies House at the same time as the annual Confirmation Statement. However, companies and LLPs do need to confirm (in their annual Confirmation Statement) that they have complied with the new requirements of the PSC Regime. This applies to companies and LLPs that deliver Confirmation Statements on or after 26 June 2017.
  • There are also changes to the protection regime (where application can be made to have PSC information withheld from the public register where disclosure would put a person at risk of violence or intimidation) so that credit and financial institutions will be able to access “secured” PSC information where appropriate.
  • Companies House has introduced a number of new and amended forms for the purposes of registering and updating information required by the PSC Regime.